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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to explore the radical left in government in Latin America, particular in 
Venezuela and Bolivia, and to what extent the achieved political and socio-economic policies 
accomplished by the governments have contributed to deepening democracy, either related to the 
concept of liberal democracy or participatory democracy. It is argued that democracy both has been 
weakening and deepening. On the one hand, democracy has been weakening, to some extent, if we 
measure democracy as equivalent to liberal democratic institutions such as elections, political 
freedoms and accountability, particular in the case of Venezuela. However, on the other hand, it 
can be argued that new participatory dimensions have increased, resulting in deepening of 
democracy, for example as in Bolivia. Still, all radical left administrations are facing several obstacles 
to overcome in order to deepen democracy, both when it comes to develop democratic institutions 
in accordance with the liberal as well as the participatory traditions. 
Keywords: Liberal Democracy; Participatory Democracy; Left; Bolivia; Venezuela 
  
Resumen 
El objetivo de este artículo es explorar las acciones de política pública de los gobiernos de izquierda 
radical en América Latina, especialmente en Venezuela y Bolivia, así como en qué medida dichas 
políticas implementadas en materia socio-económica y política han contribuido a la 
democratización, ya sea relacionada con el concepto de la democracia liberal o participativa. En el 
presente artículo se argumenta que la democracia se ha debilitado y profundizado a la vez; por un 
lado, la democracia se ha ido debilitando, hasta cierto punto, si medimos la democracia como en 
relación a las instituciones democráticas liberales, las elecciones, libertades políticas y rendición de 
cuentas, en particular en el caso de Venezuela. Sin embargo, por otro lado, se puede argumentar 
que las nuevas dimensiones de participación han aumentado, lo que resulta en la profundización de 
la democracia, como en Bolivia, por ejemplo. Sin embargo, todos los gobiernos de izquierda radical 
se enfrentan a numerosos obstáculos para profundizar la democracia, tanto para desarrollar las 
instituciones democráticas de conformidad tanto desde la tradición participativa como liberal. 
Palabras clave: Democracia Liberal; Democracia Participativa; Izquierda; Bolivia; Venezuela. 
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THE RADICAL LEFT IN GOVERNMENT: DEEPENING AND 
CONSTRAINING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA AND BOLIVIA 
 
Introdução.- 
By 2009, as many as fourteen presidencies (see table in this article) are occupied by the left. In 
Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, and El Salvador, 
the reformist and social-democratic presidents have attempted to carry out liberal democracy, with 
modest social and economic reforms. These reforms are seen as moderate in the sense that they 
have not challenged the global political or economic order of today – liberal democracy and market 
economy − although some attempts to modify the neoliberal economy, especially on issues related 
to free trade and privatization, have taken place.   
However, in other Latin American countries − such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
− the presidents have been much more radical, challenging or trying to challenge the political, 
social, and global economic order (Katz 2007; Walker 2008; Moreno-Brid and Paunovic 2008). 
These are considered radical for several reasons: One is the radical socioeconomic agenda and how 
democracy is understood as a concept; in reality, it is the ambition to deepen democracy through 
peoples’ participation in the political and socio-economic spheres. This stands in sharp contrast to 
the liberal representative democratic tradition and its focus on elections, political rights and vertical 
and horizontal accountability (see Lipset 1959; Dahl 1971; Diamond 1996).  Another reason is that 
the left, during presidential terms, through party agendas or other means such as public speeches, 
have opposed the ideas behind free trade as well as the supranational organizations behind the 
market-based policies. Moreover, these radical presidencies attempt to challenge the domestic elites 
who support the ideas of electoral democracy and global free market economy (see Middlebrook 
2000). Still in reality, the left regimes have not accomplished as much as one would expect in 
practice when it comes to income redistribution − with a few exceptions such as Venezuela and 
Bolivia (see Cornia 2010).  
However, much of previous research on the Latin American left have focused on issues such the 
definition of the left and what types of the left that exist, i.e. populist, participatory, radical, social-
democratic or the nationalist left (e.g. Castañeda 1993; Roberts 1998; Katz 2007; Walker 2008; 
Moreno-Brid, and Paunovic 2008); the left wave as a phenomenon (Cleary 2006; Castañeda, and 
Morales 2008), the leadership related to populism (e.g. Motta 2011), different topics and cases 
related to the left (e.g. Cameron and Sharpe 2010); and a few have begun to focus on the outcome 
of the policies or discuss it in relation to democracy (e.g. Ellner 2010; Kohl 2010). But analyzes 
about the left’s ambition to deepen democracy, and the outcome of this process, remains relatively 
underexplored. This article has it main focus on this issue.   
The aim of this article is to explore the radical left in Latin America, particular in Venezuela and 
Bolivia, and discusses to what extent the achieved political and socio-economic policies have 
contributed to deepening democracy, either related to the concept of liberal democracy or 
participatory democracy. It is argued that democracy both has been weakening and deepening. On 
the one hand, democracy has been weakening, to some extent, if we measure democracy as 
equivalent to liberal democratic institutions such as elections, political freedoms and accountability, 
particular in the case of Venezuela. However, on the other hand, it can be argued that new 
participatory dimensions have increased, resulting in deepening of democracy, for example as in 
Bolivia. Still, all radical left administrations are facing several obstacles to overcome in order to 
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deepen democracy, both when it comes to develop democratic institutions in accordance with the 
liberal as well as the participatory traditions.    
 
The Left and Deepening Democracy 
During most part of the 20th century the left played an anonymous role in Latin America. In most 
countries the left was not allowed to participate in elections, and if they participated, frauds were 
most likely to happen. Rather than playing a significant political role the left’s different guerilla 
movements, established in almost every country, became the dominant path of the radical left. 
However, the Latin American left has always been divided and split into different parties, factions 
or groups.  In particular, its relation to democracy has historically been problematic. As we know, 
before the Cold War ended, the left interpreted democracy as a mean, for the elite and external 
powers, to subordinate the people. Instead, and particularly during the 1950 to 1970s, the left 
emphasized socio-economic development and national independence, rather than the struggle for 
democratic development.  A few exceptions were the social-democrats in Costa Rica, Venezuela, 
the Chilean left during Allende, and a few intellectuals (Castañeda 1993:327), who accepted 
representative democracy and market economy.  
For most part, however, of the left, the debate was largely confined to how to best translate 
Marxism-Leninism to Latin American conditions (López Castellanos 2001). For most left parties 
the ideological orientation and the concept of class were key concepts. But after the collapse of the 
Eastern bloc and the ideology of Communism; the left became ideologically exhausted.  The 
immediate consequences resulted in the gradual decline of Marxism-Leninism, the Marxist utopia 
and serious doubts about the entire idea of social revolution. In the 1990s, only a few organizations, 
parties and left leaders maintained close ties to the idea of a violent social revolution (Brown 1996). 
As a result of these events, in an era of globalization and neo-liberal policies, the left had difficulties 
redefining its role in society. However, the left did not only have to deal with its internal failure as a 
socialistic project, it also had to challenge the hegemony of neoliberalism in an era when military 
dictatorships had been replaced by democratically elected governments.  After the transition to 
democracy in the 1980s, most of the democratically elected administrations became right-wing or 
conservative. This was changed in the late 1990s, as the left was suddenly confronted with the task 
of finding an alternative to the economic neoliberal model and how to deepen democracy in Latin 
America. Although it lacked a clear and unitary path toward this aim, the legacy of violent 
revolution, class and strictly ideological orientation were vanished and the ballot box enabled a 
wave of successful elections. 
 This left wave began in 1998 (see Schamis 2006; Castañeda and Morales 2008; Baker and Greene 
2011) with Hugo Chávez’s populist leftist victory by an overwhelming majority in Venezuela. 
Chávez’s victory was followed by Chile in 1999, when the moderate socialist Ricardo Lagos was 
elected president; Lagos represented the center-left coalition, la Concertación,that had ruled Chile 
since the return of democratic rule in 1990 with two Christian democratic presidents. It was 
followed by leftist winners in additional twelve countries, and the trend might have witnessed the 
beginning of the end with the victory of the right-wing candidate in the Chilean presidential 
election, in early 2010. The electoral victories of the left moved on to Brazil, where Luis Inácio 
“Lula’ da Silva, the former metalworker union leader and the leader of Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT, the Worker’s Party) was installed as the new president in 2003 (and was re-elected in 2006); 
and to Ecuador, where the military officer Lucio Gutierrez won the presidency on a populist 
platform, with the support of indigenous people in 2003; to Argentina, where Néstor Kirchner won 
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the presidential election in 2003, representing the left-wing Perionist party and alliance, Frente para 
la Victoria.  Alluding to this wave of electoral leftist successes, Hugo Chávez, during an 
unannounced appearance to the 2003 World Social Forum in Porto Allegre, Brazil, called attention 
to the ‘the birth of a new left’ in Latin America.  
During 2004 to 2006, the left wave continued with the victories of a presidential candidate from the 
Frente Amplios in Uruguay, the indigenous Evo Morales and his radical agenda in Bolivia, the 
socialist Michelle Bachelet’s success in Chile, the Partido Liberacion, member of the international 
group of Social Democrats’, reclaiming of the presidency in Costa Rica, and the re-election of 
former president Alan García in Peru representing the third way social-democratic, Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana. Also, in 2006, the former revolutionary Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega 
won the presidential race in Nicaragua, and Rafael Correa’s Alianza Patria Altiva I Soberana (PAIS) 
won the presidency in Ecuador. In the late 2007, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner won the 
presidential election in Argentina representing the Frente para la Victoria through the Plural 
Consensus alliance, and the social-democrat Álvaro Colom won the run-off election for president 
in Guatemala.  In 2008 the leftist Fernando Lugo won the election in Paraguay, and in 2009 the 
former guerilla movement Frente Farabundo Martí para Liberación Nacional (FMLN) won the 
presidential election in El Salvador, with a moderate candidate. In late 2009, in Brazil, the left 
managed to get Dilma Rousseff elected as the first female president of the country, and the Frente 
Amplios won another presidential election in Uruguay. In Peru, the left managed to maintain in 
power, when the somewhat both radical and moderate Ollanta Humala won the run-off election 
against the daughter of the former dictator Fujimori, Keiko Fujimori. Finally, in 2012 Hugo Chávez 
once more was re-elected as president of Venezuela.  
Table: Latin America’s left presidencies, 1998-2012 
   Year  Country     President  Party/Party Coalition Direction in 
office 
1999- Venezuela Hugo Chávez Movimiento Quinta 
República/Partido 
Socialista Unido de 
Venezuela 
Radical 
2000-2006 Chile Ricardo Lagos Partido Socialista (PS) Moderate 
2003-2010 Brazil Lula da Silva Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT) 
Moderate 
2003-2007 Argentina Néstor Kirchner Frente para la Victoria Moderate 
2004-2009 Panama Martín E. Torrijos Partido Revolucionario 
Democrático, (PRD) 
Moderate 
2005-2010 Uruguay  Tabaré Vázquez Frente  Amplios Moderate 
2006- Bolivia Evo Morales Movimiento al socialism Radical 
2006-2010 Costa Rica Óscar Arias Sánchez Partido Liberación 
Nacional (PLN) 
Moderate 
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2006-2010 Chile Michelle Bachelet Partido Socialista (PS) Moderate 
2006-2011 Peru Alan Garcia  Alianza Popular 
Revolucionaria Americana 
(APRA) 
Moderate 
2006- Nicaragua  Daniel Ortega Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional 
(FSLN) 
Radical 
2007- Argentina Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner 
Frente para la Victoria 
(FPL) 
Moderate 
2007- Ecuador Rafael Correa Alianza Patria Altiva I 
Soberana (PAIS) 
Radical 
2008-2012 Paraguay Fernando Lugo Concertación Nacional 
(CN)  
Moderate 
2008- Guatemala Álvaro Colom Unidad Nacional de la 
Esperanza (UNA) 
Moderate 
2009- El Salvador Mauricio Funes Frente Farabundo Martí 
para Liberación Nacional 
(FMLN) 
Moderate 
2010- Uruguay  José Mujica  Frente  Amplios Moderate 
2010- Costa Rica Laura Chinchilla  
Miranda 
Partido Liberación 
Nacional (PLN) 
Moderate 
2011- Brazil Dilma Rousseff Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT) 
Moderate 
2011- Peru Ollanta Humala Partido Nacionalista 
Peruano (PNP) 
Moderate 
 
These victories, taken together, represent a monumental trend that has not been matched 
historically (see Cleary 2006:35). However, this wave, of course, cannot be seen as uniformed left, 
nor a united left. Among the literature the  categorizations of the left have included several 
acronyms such as moderate left, reformist left, social-democrats, socialists, left-wing populism, 
leftist neopopulism, the participatory left, the radical left, the petro-left, and the nationalist left. 
However, this article moves beyond the multiplicity of conceptualizations toward two broad 
categories that encompass distinct tendencies in terms of the party’s view of democracy, economy 
and socio-economic reforms (see Roberts 1998: 18-19; Castañeda 1993; Castañeda and Morales 
2008; Walker 2008).  The two categories used are the radical left and the social-democratic left. 
Following Arditi (2008) the categorizations are constructed as the left has manifested itself in 
different cases through party programs, speeches or in other actions or policies in government or in 
opposition.  
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The first is the radical left, a broad category, in which the left in all cases challenges liberal 
democracy and the hegemony of market economic policies, i.e. neoliberalism in the 1990s-2000s, 
but still supports the idea about institutional democracy with elections and other political rights. 
However, above all, the radical left has always been struggling for state-intervention in the 
economic sector, social reforms, and redistribution of wealth to the masses. This radical left is 
today represented by the primary and dominated left parties in for example Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia (see table), though the left in office in Brazil for 
example seems to be more moderate and social-democratic. These parties’ platforms and policies 
carried out in office, or proposals in opposition, have similarities with Salvador Allende’s 
presidency in Chile (1970-73), and the left-coalition in Guatemala during the radical democratic 
period (1944-54), but has also some parallels to traditional European social democratic socio-
economic policies, advocating an active and strong state to promote social and economic 
development.  
 
The radical left has, at least, three different tendencies, which sometimes exist in the same party, 
but sometimes only one at the time.  The first is populism meaning that the radical left quite often 
adheres to a populist agenda with drastic socio-economic reforms and re-distribution of land that is 
attractive to the broad masses of workers and indigenous people, but not seen by many others as 
possible to achieve in reality (see March 2007; Walker 2008). According to Walker (2008:9) the 
resurgence of this contemporary popular left largely depends on the collapse of the old political 
institutions as well as new social demands from young people, workers and indigenous people.  The 
broad left movement behind Chávez in Venezuela and Morales in Bolivia are two good examples. 
Allende’s Unidad Popular that aimed to carry out drastic socio-economic reforms also fits into this 
tendency as well as the ruling coalition during the radical president Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala 
(1951-54).  
The second is participation, in which the left advocate people’s participation, i.e. participatory 
democracy, particular with emphasize to get people engaged at local level and in the socio-
economic spheres (see for example Barber 1984; Pateman 1970).  This idea stands opposed to the 
idea of representative liberal democracy, though it is still within the framework of institutional 
democracy. In particular, the Worker’s party in Brazil stands behind this idea, but it also has some 
features in most of the other cases, such as in Venezuela and Bolivia. In Venezuela this process has 
been initiated from above after the left under Chávez has won several elections during the last 
decade, while in Bolivia the left was mobilized long before Morales was elected as president in 
2005. The idea of participation was also a key character of Unidad Popular, the coalition behind 
Salvador Allende’s presidency (1970-73). The Allende government was about to launch a new 
constitution, emphasizing participatory democracy in Chile, almost similar to the case of both 
Venezuela and Bolivia in the 2000s, but the military coup in 1973 prevented such development.  
 
The third tendency is that the radical left quite often has traditional linkages to the ideology of 
Marxism and to other Marxist parties around the world. Two good examples are the former guerilla 
groups in Nicaragua and El Salvador, which still have a major internal debate about their Marxist in 
heritage.  Also the contemporary left in Venezuela and Bolivia has connections to the communist 
left, and in the case of president Allende, the communists was actually a part of the ruling coalition. 
This was also the case for the Árbenz government in Guatemala. However, as has been stated the 
radical left has not per se be seen as one single and united political force in Latin America, with 
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exactly the same political agenda all over the region. But the radical left has been and still is united 
in a broader sense, mainly because it has always been challenging the liberal doctrines of democratic 
institutions and market-driven economic policies (neoliberalism in the 1980-1990s) trying to 
address much more of state-led economic policies, social reforms, and redistribution of wealth 
from rich to poor people, however, still accepting the rule of institutional democracy.  
The second category is the left-of-centre’s social democrats. Though the social democratic parties 
stand for a number of different political agendas all over the world, still, they have all belonged and 
still do belong to the international socialist and social democratic party group. In Latin America, the 
third way social-democrats have also adhered to policies of developing liberal democracy, market 
economy  and maintaining most of the characters of their predecessors’ neoliberal economic 
policies from the 1990s, though some modification have taken place. These modern Social 
Democrats – “La Tercera Via” (see for example Carazo 2000) - tend to stand for reformism and 
pragmatism, having eliminated former vocabulary such as “class struggle” and “socialism”. This 
tendency follows the route of Anthony Giddens’ (1994) analysis of third way of social democracy, 
standing to the right of the radical left in the global era.  In theory, this implies a modern stance on 
issues related to globalization, economic integration and the free market. In reality, however, it 
means acceptance of the neoliberal economic world order, but also encompasses ideas such as 
protection of the weak, social justice, rights with obligations, and cosmopolitan pluralism.  Of 
course there exist differences and some of the social democratic parties are today still much more 
ideological oriented (Chile), elite-oriented (Costa Rica), or is seen as united force of catch-all left 
groups (Uruguay, Argentina) or is just as a pragmatic party to the left distinguished from the radical 
left and the right (Peru). Finally, a third main category could be the orthodox left-wing Communist 
parties (in Chile for example), who plays a minor role in a few countries, but they are no longer any 
major force against either the right or the left in today’s democratized Latin America.  
The question is, however, what it means when we are talking about the left’s ambition to deepen 
democracy. In a broader spectrum, in situating the conceptualization of the Latin American, one 
finds right-wing parties, commercial groups, military forces and the U.S. administration at one end, 
which adhere to an elite electoral democracy and a neoliberal economic system (McSherry 1998). 
Related to this departure, deepening democracy means more democracy than before (i.e. in this 
article, compared to before the left came to power) or more democracy beyond electoral democracy 
(i.e. if one discusses democratic development after the first free and fair elections). At the opposite 
end of the spectrum one finds the radical, participatory left with an anti-capitalistic agenda. In 
between these two extremes lies the Christian democrats and the social democratic left—i.e., the 
“left-of-centre”, which promotes liberal democracy (see Roberts 1998; Lievesley 1999). Liberal 
democracy as well as participatory democracy means more democracy in contrast to electoral 
democracy, with its focus on free and fair elections, in which the competition to win elections is the 
main thing. Democracy is deepened, at least theoretically, in both these routes. It is deepened in a 
liberal democracy, because it means more civil and political right for the people and a more well-
functioning democracy, including aspects of vertical and horizontal accountability (Dahl 1971; 
Diamond 1996). It is deepened in a participatory democracy, because it means more possibility for 
people to actively participate in political decision-making, particular at local grassroots-level and on 
issues related to daily-life socio-economic issues (Barber 1984; Pateman 1970). However, the 
question now with the radical left regimes’ ambition to establish and develop participatory elements 
of democracy is to what extent democracy has deepened during the radical left’s presidency, or if 
the left’s policies rather has constrained democracy in the 2000s. We start with the case of 
Venezuela.  
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The case of Venezuela (1998-)  
No matter what one thinks about the Chávez’s government, the “Chavismo” (Ellner 2010), the 
“Bolivarian socialist revolution” (see Hawkins 2010; McCoy 2010), or “Twenty-first-century-
socialism” (Irazábal and Foley 2010) and what it has (or not) achieved, still it holds the record in 
winning a good number of elections, as never before in the history of Venezuela, or among radical 
left leaders in Latin America. It includes; the presidential elections in 1998, and 2000, 2006 and 
2012 under the new constitution; the parliamentary elections in 2000, 2005 and 2010; the 
referendums on the new constitution in 1999, including constitutional amendments in 2007 (only 
defeat) and 2009; and the recall referendum about Chávez’s status as president or not. All these 
elections were discussed through electoral campaigns and debates, and were validated by 
international observers and media (Ellner 2010:80). It means that Venezuela still maintain the basic 
foundations of a representative liberal democracy, though one could discuss to what extent it still 
could be defined as an electoral democracy.  
However, the Bolivarian revolution has carried out the deepest political transformations and social 
and economic reforms since the start of the contemporary left wave across Latin America. It has 
been, by nature, deeply anti-globalization and against most of the global institutions and norms 
from the Western hemisphere; no government has challenged the contemporary international 
hegemony as much as Chávez. Furthermore, it is the only Latin American case so far that has really 
challenged and largely replaced the previous game of democracy and socioeconomic system: in the 
Venezuelan case, the liberal political system rooted in the Pacto de Punto Fijo of 1958, and with its 
neoliberal socio-economic policies from the 1990s (see Moreno-Brid and Paunovic 2008; Kornblith 
and Jawahar 2005; McCoy 2005, 2010).  
In fact, Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution has, at least in theory, called for strengthening civil rights 
and building a participatory, protagonist democracy, and establishing a solidarity economy. The 
model of participatory democracy is explicitly established in the 1999 constitution of Venezuela 
(Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 1999). At the same time, there still seems 
to exist an intention to maintain a representative liberal democratic system parallel to a more 
socialist participatory democracy (see Azzellini 2010; McCoy 2010). This hybrid form is expressed 
in different laws and in national and local planning of concrete socio-economic policies (Irazábal 
and Foley 2010). Except for the national referendums, the action of direct participation is more 
relevant at local level, and particular in the local planning. However, still there are elected mayors 
and representative local municipalities, but around half of its members are elected by so called local 
organizations, as a counterpart to the representative body.  
To some extent, the revolutionary process has been initiated both from above and below (see 
López-Valladares 2008; Azzellini 2010; Hawkins 2010; Beasley-Murray 2010). One strategy to 
achieve socialism from above has been to create a parallel structure to the state through these local 
organizations in civil society, stimulating peoples’ participation in the revolutionary process. The 
main idea has been to establish councils – Communal councils, Communes and Communal cities – 
in which people are supposed to become engaged and make and implement decisions related to 
community development and projects. In addition to this council, there also exist health 
committees, cooperatives, and urban land committees, which basically administrate state programs 
related to reducing poverty; providing health care, land and housing; and creating alternative forms 
of business to the market. Back in 2001, Chávez began organizing civil society in Círculos 
Bolivarianos as a key actor to push forward and defence of the revolution. For example, in 2001, 
more than 20,000 members of Círculos throughout the country were sworn in a mass ceremony in 
Caracas; later, it had about 2.2 million members (Hawkins and Hansen 2006: 103). At the beginning 
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of Chávez’s time in office, these circles played a significant role, but during the last years, it has 
diminished. Still, all of these actions could be seen as an expression of the value of grassroots 
participation by civil society. 
As a conclusion, however, Venezuela has a hybrid political system, in which it both exist 
representative liberal institutions with elections and political parties, and more participatory direct 
democratic bodies, including social organizations, at local level. As Azzelini (2010) understands it, 
the ambition is to create parallel structures to the liberal institutions, but to focus on social 
development at local level.     
During the first years of Chávez much of the political agenda was related to the new constitution 
which also incorporated concepts about social rights such as education, health and other welfare 
issues (Ellner 2010). Furthermore, still the government emphasized, as its processor, fiscal macro-
economic discipline, in accordance with the international community, represented by global 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. To adjust to these structural adjustment policies, 
some programs to compensate social issues was put in place. However, around 2002-2003, the 
administration became more radical and made a clear cut with the hegemony of neoliberal 
economic and social policies, as well as its forerunners around the world (Nakatani and Herrera 
2008). According to Ellner (2010), the Chávez government has initiated economic reforms to be 
able to achieve the three main goals; overcome dependence on U.S. oil market, avoid dependence 
on capital and technology from other capitalist countries, and challenge national oligopoly by open 
up for competition. The economic reforms include nationalization of parts of the oil businesses and 
other key sectors such banking, electricity, and telecommunication, steel and cement; a more active 
state in exporting Venezuelans goods and promoting joint venture projects; and much more 
emphasize in developing infrastructure including roads, harbours and trains.   
 
In addition, several states financed and controlled social programs have been initiated aiming to 
broaden social rights such as universal healthcare and education (including campaign against 
illiteracy) and to reduce income inequality as well as promote state ownership of certain economic 
and social sectors (McCoy 2010; Nakatani and Herrera 2008).  Most of the socioeconomic reforms 
have been channeled through state programs: Mision Mercal is a nationwide state-owned storage 
that subsidizes food and other basic products, as well as soup kitchen; Mision Barrio Adentro 
provides free medical care for all people; Mission Guaicaipuro aims to guarantee indigenous people 
their collective rights; and Mission Zamora gives small farmers some rights to expropriate the land 
from bigger farmers (see Hawkins 2010).  Instead of its processors neoliberal macro-economic 
policies, the Chávez-administration has implemented a more state lead economy, though still most 
of the economy still is in the private sector. To large extent, the social reforms have been financed 
by oil, in which the state has nationalized the major private oil company. The dependence of oil, 
however, is one of the major problems with the economy of Venezuela. To conclude, as a result 
however, already by 2007, Venezuela had reduced poverty from roughly 55 percent to less than 30 
percent (Nakatani and Herrera 2008: 294), including extreme poverty, and most people now also 
have access to free public education and a nation-wide healthcare system.   
However, the Venezuelan case raises the issue about deepening democracy, what democracy means 
and if it exist, and what type of democracy that does exist with all its features and shortcomings. 
Several concerns have to be raised about development in Venezuela. First, although Venezuela has 
been practicing free and fair elections in the 1990 and 2000s, and in fact since 1958, other liberal 
democratic institutions have gradually eroded during recent years. In Latin America, no other leftist 
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government has taken such measures and policies to strengthen the power of the presidency while 
weakening the power of Congress, the judicial system, and some political and civil rights − 
including the free media − as much as Venezuela during the Chávez administration. As for 
example, Ellner (2010) has pointed out, several key positions as the attorney general, national 
controller and members of the electoral council are sympathizers with the socialist revolution. In 
addition, president Chávez has carried out some policies through presidential decree. Since the 
parliament has been in almost total control of the government, the opposition has been weak. It 
means that the checks and balances are very weak.  
It has also gone so far that Freedom House, since 2009, does not anymore consider Venezuela as 
an electoral democracy, though they consider the elections themselves as having been relatively free 
and fair (Freedom House 2010). The rationale behind this judgement is mainly because Freedom 
House considers that the opposition has to work under generally poor political conditions and 
because the weakness’ of separation of powers or the checks and balances. Freedom House’s report 
raises several concerns. Worth mentioning as well are that there seem to be no limit for the 
government of using states resources in the political campaigns for example through state 
television, the social campaigns seems to blur between the official state role and the ruling party, 
and due to the fact the government is directly controlling state funds for socio-economic programs 
leads often to corruption (Freedom House 2012).   
Second, furthermore, from a participatory democratic perspective, critical remarks must also be 
made. While the democratic system in Venezuela, according to Ellner (2010), attached the 
importance of mobilization of the people and popular sectors other mechanism, such as the 
internal debate and institutionalization of participatory democracy, as a new rule of game lies far 
behind. At the same time, figures from the Latinbarometro (2008) support the fact that positive 
feelings of the democratic system nowadays has been higher compared to average in Latin America. 
In addition, Hawkins (2010) concludes that participation has increased among poor people and 
women, and that it also gives people an opportunity to participate in everyday practise and choose 
leaders of the organizations.    
However, Hawkins and Hansen (2006) argue that the role of civic organizations role to strengthen 
democracy in Venezuela has a paradox: On one hand, the Círculos and other councils and state 
programs have been working with democratic methods and goals and, therefore, could be 
considered as pro-democratic forces. On the other hand, these civil organizations’ relations with the 
presidency under Chávez could not be seen as signs of autonomy (financial or related to the 
content), and they embodied strong charismatic and negative links with Chávez’s strong overtones 
of clientelism that has undermined their role in strengthening democracy. As Azzellini (2010) states 
the dependent relations between the state and all the community organization opens up for 
clientelism (see also Irazábal and Foley, 2010). In addition, according to Hawkins (2010), all the 
councils and programs are totally dependent on government funding and, in a way, are controlled 
by the state authority under the Chávez’s presidency. Though the programs invite people from less 
active such as women and poor people, most participants are still very active Chávez’ supporters.    
To summarize, democratic concerns about the development must be raised both from a liberal as 
well as a participatory democratic perspective.  Although the Bolivarian revolution, as such, could 
be understood as mostly top-led by the state, it could also be seen as having a bottom-up structure 
since the people through civil society might get a chance to influence everyday decisions at a local 
level (Azzelini 2010; McCoy 2010). If one also includes that Venezuela still have functioning free 
and fair elections, it makes into a remarkable hybrid case, with several features of liberal and 
participatory democracy. Worth mentioning, however, is that no matter how one judges it, the 
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Bolivarian revolution has no intention of separating the political society or the state from civil 
society: It is the key point in the participatory democratic model (Azzelini 2010:18). 
At the same time, however, no other government in Latin America has challenged or met such hard 
resistance as Chávez’s (McCoy 2010). Since the radicalization began, Chávez has survived several 
major political crises or attempted military coups (McCoy 2005; Kornblith and Jahawar 2005). Since 
the revolution began, he has survived a military coup (2002), won referendums on staying in office 
and on a new constitution (2004) and, in 2006, was re-elected as president. Furthermore, in 
December 2007, the failure to win approval for additional constitutional changes seemed to 
temporarily weaken Chávez’s authority, but this all changed again in late 2008, when he won 
another constitutional referendum (this time about the possibility for presidents to be re-elected 
more than twice). Still, the revolution seems to have support from many poor sectors of 
Venezuelan society.  
Nonetheless, the last year of reforms to nationalize banks, food factories, and natural mineral 
companies have further increased polarization between the pro-Chavistas and the domestic 
opposition (including international actors such as the United States), and foreign companies. 
Furthermore, the harder climate that constrains a free media and other political rights has further 
polarized Venezuelan society. As a result of this radicalization in the 2000s, Venezuela might not 
develop a participatory democracy in which the state, civil society and the people are engaged in 
developing the country together. Instead, Venezuela might have left the old liberal democratic 
system, moving toward participatory democracy, but ending up with a one-man dictatorship and a 
further decrease in political rights, with state control over civil society and the media, yet with 
increasing of social rights. It is a paradox: The poor people might have it better; meanwhile, the 
democratic system might erode even more. 
 
The Bolivian case (2005-) 
The second most radical and controversial case is Bolivia (Walker 2008; Sánchez 2008; Rochlin 
2007). In late 2005, Evo Morales won the presidency, and the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) 
became the most important political actor.  The background of Morales and MAS’s victory is that 
they managed to form a coalition of supporters, including indigenous peasants, miners, landless 
peasants, and indigenous movements, claiming cultural and civil rights. They all share a common 
hostile view of globalization and neoliberalism, and lack any larger representation before MAS 
began to succeed (Postero 2010a, 2010b; Anria 2010). After Morales took office, a call for a 
sociocultural and democratic revolution was made proclaiming nationalization of gas and oil, 
agrarian and land reforms, and that a constitutional assembly would create a more equal 
constitution.  This radicalization has continued, for example at a United Nations speech to 
celebrate the declaration of Indigenous rights, Morales talked about eradiate capitalism and 
substitute it with communitarian socialism, blaming capitalism for the exploitation  of natural and 
human resources (Postero 2010b:59).    
 
However, though the case of Bolivia has major differences with Venezuela, it also has major 
similarities. First, in terms of the ambition to change society, both have had and still have radical 
plans; Chávez and Morales have launched new constitutions marking a clear cut with the old society 
and the existing social order, marking a new political and socio-economic direction for both the 
countries. In both countries the former ruling elite – conservative parties, landlords, military forces 
Revista Andina de Estudios Políticos  Vol. III, N° 1, 70-89.     
81 
 
and rich entrepreneurs – have more or less opposed the radical development, and have tried to 
prevent this path, sometimes with unconstitutional methods such as the regular military coups as in 
Venezuela 2002. Second, both have leftist ideas, though it looks somewhat different, about 
participation as a part of the democratic system. Though both have tried to get support from poor 
people, farmers and indigenous groups, Bolivia is a stronger case in this matter. In Bolivia, the 
participatory dimension is furthermore more focused on referendums and related to indigenous 
people.  Third, both leaders and the parties behind are founded upon the rejection of neoliberal 
ideas about society, which means rejections of the economic system and social policies as it was 
developed in the 1990s. It also includes ideas to develop democracy beyond liberal democracy. 
Fourth, both have so far had a majority of the population behind them in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections, as well as in a great number of referendums about future issues. Morales 
has won the presidential elections in 2005 and 2009, including elections to the parliament and a 
constitutional assembly and recall referendum as well as one constitutional referendum.  
 
As in the case of Venezuela, Morales initiated reforms of the political system through the game of 
the liberal institutional setting when a new constitution was introduced.  After the landslide victory 
in 2005, an election to a constitutional assembly to rewrite the constitution was held.  However, 
since MAS lacked the required two-third majority to vote for the outcome, the majority of MAS 
decided that each article would pass with a simple majority, but that the draft of the entire 
constitution still needed two-thirds majority. In December 2007, the elected constitutional 
assembly, with the majority of the MAS, voted for major changes to the constitution: The changes 
would establish both direct and indirect democratic institutions, and Bolivia was about to become 
an official multiethnic country, in which social reforms was supposed to be financed by the national 
mineral resources.  According to Postero (2010b:67), however, some critical voice, mainly from the 
political right and its allies such as landlords, entrepreneurs and other rich people, were raised on 
how the constitutional process was run (see also Anria 2010; De la Fuente Jeria 2010; Valdiva 2010; 
Rocabado 2010). As a consequence, some of the richer regions held referendums that resulted in 
proclaiming autonomous regional status. However, these referendums were not recognized by the 
central government or by the judicial system; this was followed by demonstrations and uprising 
against the Morales administration. The problem was now how to succeed with the constitutional 
work, since a new constitution by the law needed two-thirds majority pass.  A majority of the 
opposition was against most parts of the constitution meanwhile the regional prefects, in addition, 
demanded to move the capital from La Paz to the region of Sucre. For a while, it looked like that 
the constitutional process would end. But after several months of death lock, Morales used a 
constitutional weapon when he launched recall referendums about his presidency and the regional 
prefects. Morales won the referendum and several opposition leaders lost. According to Cameron 
and Sharpe (2010, 72) this changed the balance of power in Bolivia; from now on, the leaders of the 
opposition in Congress, and the regions were more or less forced to negotiate a new draft of the 
constitution. Finally, on January 2009 the constitution was approved in a referendum by over a sixty 
percent margin (Postero 2010b:67). 
The constitution – Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia (2009) - defines Bolivia 
in article one as a unitary social state of pluri-national multiethnic and secular (rather than just 
catholic) country (see also Lupien 2011; Postero 2010a-b). It means that Bolivia is a nation among 
many nations, and that the indigenous groups have their civil and cultural rights, as well as rural 
self-government as long as the laws of the country are not broken. Furthermore, democracy is 
defined as a combination of direct participatory democracy and indirect representative liberal 
democracy, but with a clear separation of power between the presidency, legislative, judicial and 
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electoral power (recall of elected officers). Participation takes place through actions such as 
referenda, citizens’ initiatives and prior consultations, while representative democracy is practiced 
through the regular elections.  The new constitution recognizes departmental autonomy as well as 
municipal, provincial, and indigenous autonomy.  When it comes to economic issues it is stated that 
it is a mixed economy with both ownership of the state, communes, and private people. It means 
for example also that natural resources such as gas, oil and water will be administrated in the 
collective interest through the state. In addition, the constitution gives the people several social 
rights to water, food, education, health care and other basic socio-economic conditions.   
During the first years of this new radical presidency, Bolivia boasted mostly positive 
macroeconomic indicators related to growth, unemployment, and trade, for example the economic 
growth increased to from 3.7 (2005) to 6,1 percent (2009) and GDP per capita was almost doubled 
to 4,500 (Kohl and Bresnahan 2010: 6). The most concrete examples of these radical policy 
initiatives were the nationalization of the country’s natural gas supply (some from international 
companies), bringing billions of dollars to the state. Since then the nationalization has expanded to 
cover other natural resources, such as oil, mines, water and communications. Furthermore, in late 
2006, the Bolivian Congress voted in favor of a controversial and reform program, aimed at 
redistributing land to mostly poor and indigenous people in the countryside. In addition, some 
price control of gas and food subsidies had decreased the rate of extreme poverty. Other social 
reform policies have included a campaign against illiteracy and an initiative to provide access to 
medical care in the countryside. Today, the UN recognizes Bolivia as free of illiteracy. 
However, as a contrast to Chávez, the leftist government has so far not contributed to decrease 
civil and political rights in Bolivia, nor have any major military coups taken place against the 
democratically elected government. Though there had been periods of social unrest since Morales 
took office, such as during the constitutional debate in 2008, and in 2010-11 when some subsidies 
of gas were decreased, there has been no real attempt of coups, or similar uncivil actions (Anria 
2010; Valdivia 2010; Kohl and Bresnahan 2010; Kohl 2010).   
The key question is, however, to what extent the Morales administration has deepen democracy, 
and to what extent one could criticize the democratic path. In accordance with the liberal tradition, 
or vertical accountability, the voters have continued to vote for Morales and MAS in the 
constitutional assembly 2006, the recall referendum in 2008, and in the referendum for a new 
constitution in 2009, and in elections to presidency and congress in 2009. Regard to Freedom 
House (2005-2012), Bolivia is still a young democracy, but shows that civil and political rights have 
been stable around 3 (scale: 1-7) during the Morales administration, the same as when he assumed 
office.  Regard the horizontal accountability, according to Anria (2010), the congress has weakened 
its position, but this has to do with the crisis of the party system and the weak and unorganized 
opposition, rather than as a result of actions taken by the Evo Morale’s presidency.  
 
At the same time, along with a participatory tradition Morales has frequently launched referendums 
as a method to talk directly to the people (see Anria 2010; Montambeault 2011). However, this 
creates internal problems within the MAS, since its bottom-up structure could be understood as a 
centralization of power of the agenda to the presidency. Rather than trying to get support from the 
roots of MAS, the presidency relies on support from the people, directly though the referendums.  
Remarkable is that while Morales had to deal with the right opposition and the regional back clash 
during his first period, the focus after 2009 has been more to hand his own supporters, unions, 
social movements and indigenous groups (see Freedom House, 2012). During 2008 and 2009, the 
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debate about the constitution changes and the radical measures further increased the conflict in 
Bolivian society. As a result, on the one side, the radical left struggle against the old elite system and 
the neoliberal policies established in the 1980s to 1990s. The radical left has its main supporters 
from peasants, coca peasants, mineworkers, and indigenous people. On the other side, the rich 
upper class represents only a few regions and the former political and economic elite of the country 
but has a minority in the national parliament, trying to maintain the existing political and economic 
order. But since President Morales has aimed to continue his radical policies after the re-election in 
2009, he might get into trouble both from his opponents and from inside his own supporters if 
only parts of the radical agenda is achieved.  
 
The Contemporary Radical Left: Concluding remarks 
The new tendencies of the left in Latin America have followed two distinct paths. One is the 
reformist, social-democratic left, which supports liberal democracy and market economy. This path 
has historical roots to early democratization in for example Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Costa 
Rica. This variation of leftist politic complies with the global and national political, social, and 
economic order of the day – liberal democracy with neoliberalism. In contrast, the radical left in the 
Andes and parts of Central America emphasizes participatory democracy with socio-economic 
reforms that may challenge the rule of liberal democracy and market economy – and the major 
actors’ supporting these structures, both on the global and the domestic arena. This path has 
historical similarities with the radical cases of Guatemala in the 1940-1950s and Chile under 
Salvador Allende.  
In addition, beside the most important cases of Venezuela and Bolivia, the radical left has also been 
represented by two other governments in the 2000s: Nicaragua and Ecuador. Nicaragua is a case, 
where the former Sandinista revolutionary leader Daniel Ortega was installed as president in 
January 2007 (see Kampwirth 2008). However, Ortega and former president Aléman and his 
conservative liberal party factions have had a political pact since the 1990s that constrains politics 
and democratic development in Nicaragua while also constraining any possibility of accomplishing 
radical reforms. Although domestic politics are somewhat different in Nicaragua compared to other 
radical cases, it is still relevant to categorize the Ortega administration as radical.   
First, during Ortega’s first months in office, several political and social reforms were enacted. Some 
− such as free school for children, free medical care, and a fifty percent reduction in public 
servants’ salaries − have not been controversial. Other, more contentious reforms include Ortega’s 
decision to increase citizens’ participation in government through creation of new state authorities 
and committees, and a move to strengthen presidential control over the police and military. 
Ortega’s move to centralize presidential power immediately inspired criticism from right-wing 
opponents, who drew analogies to the revolutionary regime of the 1980s. In November 2007, 
through a presidential decree, Ortega began to implement one of his controversial ideas: Consejos 
Ciudadanos (People’s Committees), a power structure parallel to the political institutions. Second, 
during recent years, Ortega has been accused by the media and human rights groups of 
institutionalizing a dictatorship, increasing corruption, violating freedom of speech and assembly, 
and disrespecting the constitution and human rights. Another controversial example is the local 
elections in 2008, during which violations of the electoral laws were obvious − at least, according to 
the civil society, the church, United States, OAS, and the political right. Another example is the 
government’s attempt to control civil society; for example, forbidding civil organizations from 
receiving money from foreign sources if the intended use is for political purposes. However, it is 
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too early to call whether or not Nicaragua will become further radicalized as for example Venezuela 
and how it will be judged in the end.  
Ecuador has similarities both with the development in Bolivia as well as with Venezuela (see 
Cameron and Sharpe 2010).  Since Correa was elected in 2006, his PAIS (Patria Altiva I Soberana) 
has called for a revolution to achieve socialism for the 21st century, including a political, economic, 
ethical, social, educational, and health revolution, and furthermore a revolution for Latin American 
regional integration. As in the other radical cases, the Correa administration has been fighting 
against the neoliberal economic order and against the old ruling elites. In 2007, the people voted for 
a constitutional assembly, which was elected the same year, with the mission to establish a new, 
more radical constitution aiming to achieve some of the policies president Correa had called for. In 
2008, a new constitution was drafted, which was confirmed in a national referendum. As in the case 
of Bolivia, the indigenous people has achieved a central role in the constitutional as well as in the 
policies carried out. Furthermore, processes of nationalization of infrastructure and minerals, as 
well as land reforms, and major socio-economic reforms, have started.  As a consequence, and as in 
the case of Venezuela (and Bolivia), the actors behind the former political and economic power, the 
political right, landlords and rich entrepreneurs’ have protested against this development, also 
including a discussion about decreasing of political rights and the media’s role in the country.  
During the recent years, the political climate has been intensified with threats of military coups and 
other major demonstrations and strikes as a consequence.  However, president Correa will remain 
in office, at least, until 2013.  
Of course, as has been noticed, all these radical governments have similarities and differences.  All 
theirs radical political, economic, and social agendas have challenged the global order of liberal 
democracy and neoliberal economy as well as the main actors behind it: international and domestic 
elite actors − such as landlords, military forces, businessmen, international economic organizations 
− and, of course, the United States. However, the radical governments also have much that divides 
them: their degree of radicalism differs somewhat, with Venezuela as the most radical, followed by 
Bolivia, and Ecuador and Nicaragua as the least radical. Furthermore, the effects of this 
radicalization for each country and Latin America as a region are still undetermined.   
As a consequence, democracy could be deepened in the case of the radical lefts’ participatory 
democracy, because it means more possibility for people to actively participate in political decision-
making, particular at a local grassroots-level on issues related to daily-life socio-economic issues. 
But this path seems to be more problematic and controversial, both in historical time and today. 
Historically, this type of radical agenda with a more anti-capitalistic approach, and socially 
conscious has a great amount of similarities with previous attempts by left-wing parties to develop 
radical democracy with strong economic and social anti-poverty measures, as in Guatemala (1944-
54) and in Chile (1970-73) (Oxhorn 2003). In both cases the radical political and economic changes 
of society were challenged by the same actors - the economic elite, the military and external (mainly 
U.S.) forces and the parliamentary right - and these actors stood in both cases behind the military 
interventions as well as the fall of the democratic governments in Guatemala and Chile.   
The paradox is that the radical attempt to deepen democracy as, for example in Venezuela and 
Bolivia, beyond the liberal focus on political institutions, i.e. free and fair elections and freedom of 
political rights, may actually cause the failure of these institutions and the democratic rule. Though 
motivated by good intentions to for example redistribute economic resources from the rich to the 
poor people and to carry out social reforms, it may also mark the beginning of the end of 
democracy. In the short run, radical administrations have been able and may be able to carry out 
some socio-economic reforms as in the historical cases of Guatemala and Chile, but over the long 
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term the question is if democracy, as it has been seen in Latin America during the past two decades, 
will survive unless these radical governments also manage to develop the democratic rule. The 
challenge is, though, that the threat does not just seem to come from the external enemies of 
current radical administrations such as landlords, the military, the U.S.A and the private sector, but 
more problematic from the left’s own attempts to constrain political rights, as in the case of 
Venezuela.   
In Venezuela, the liberal democratic institutions have eroded since Chávez took office in the late 
1990s, but still elections and political rights are in practice. Today, by the year 2012, it scores 5 on 
Freedom House’s freedom ranking; the same year Chávez was elected, in 1998, Venezuela scored 
2.5.  It is a significant decrease on Venezuela’s civil and political rights. However, at the same time, 
to some extent, the participatory dimensions have increased another part of the democratic system, 
which is not measured in the liberal concept of democracy. Furthermore, according to polls such as 
the Latinobarometro, people in Venezuela, during the Chávez administration, have believed that 
they participate in the democratic system much more than before.   As a conclusion, democracy has 
both been weakening and deepening in Venezuela.  
In Bolivia, since Evo Morales began his presidency in 2006, however, the participatory dimensions 
through the new constitution have been created to be able to deepen democracy in the country, and 
to include more people (indigenous people) in this democratic process. Meanwhile or parallel to 
this development, the liberal representative democratic institutions still remains relatively intact. In 
2005, before Morales took office, Bolivia scored 3 in Freedom House’s ranking of freedom of the 
year; 2012 it still scores 3. In Ecuador, however, the ambition to deepen democracy through 
participatory dimensions have not yet had any effect, meanwhile the liberal institutions show some 
problems. Still, Ecuador’s freedom ranking, according to Freedom House, is still 3 (year 2012), the 
same as before during the 2000s.   In Nicaragua, the liberal democratic institutions also have 
problems; Nicaragua’s freedom rating 2012 is 4.5, compared to 3.0, the year 2005, before President 
Ortega began his presidency; meanwhile the dimensions of participation have not sufficiently 
enough increased people’s engagement in the democratic development.  
To summarize, it means that democracy regards to both liberal and participatory dimensions have 
not been deepening (0) during the radical left’s presidencies in Latin America in the 2000s, 
compared to what was the case before the radical governments came to power. Though some 
dimensions of participatory democracy have increased (+) the quality of democracy and deepen it 
to some extent in for example Venezuela, the liberal democratic institutions have eroded (-), at 
least, as much. Bolivia is the exception, so far, since the orientation toward participatory elements in 
the democratic development has been established, meanwhile the liberal democratic institutions still 
remain intact.  
Table: Radical Left Administrations and Deepening Democracy in the 2000s 
emocratic Direction 
 in  the 2000s 
Liberal 
Democracy 
Participatory 
Democracy 
 
= Deepening 
Democracy 
Venezuela (1998-) - + 
 
0 
Bolivia (2006-) 0 + 
 
+ 
Ecuador (2000s-) 0 0 
 
0 
Nicaragua (2007-) - 0 
 
- 
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To conclude, as such, the great number of democratically elected left leaders in Latin America, with 
as much as fourteen elected left presidents at the same time, is a new phenomenon, but the division 
between more radical and moderate views of democracy, however, has been witnessed before. The 
moderates of the left will most likely survive and win new elections as before. But the question 
remains: what will happen to the radical left-administrations - will they meet the same destiny as 
Guatemala (1954), Chile (1973) or as President Zelaya in Honduras (2009)? Or will they gradually 
weaken the liberal democratic institutions ending up with left-wing authoritarian regimes as in 
Cuba? Or will they survive long enough to implement radical reforms, deepen democracy, and win 
or lose new elections? These are questions that we have to wait for, at least, a decade before we 
know the consequences of the left wave that started in the 1990s. Hopefully the radical and the 
moderate left, as well as other liberal and conservative actors, at least, will continue to contribute to 
the democratic path across Latin America. 
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